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INTEGRATED LEARNING, INTEGRATED FACULTY 
Rachel Arnow-Richman* 
ABSTRACT 
A fundamental obstacle to the success of legal education’s practice-readiness 
movement is the “bifurcated faculty.” Most law schools continue to operate a two-tiered 
system in which a group of elite-credentialed “doctrinal” faculty enjoy the generous 
compensation, security, and privileges associated with tenure, while an underclass of 
contract faculty teach work-intensive “skills” courses for lower pay and lesser status. 
This Essay analyzes the bifurcated faculty as a personnel practice, leveraging insights 
from management theory and employment discrimination scholarship to evaluate law 
schools as employers. It considers, first, the rise of new economy management practices 
that eschew static job classifications in favor of greater flexibility and integration and, 
second, the role of structural discrimination in stymying institutional efforts to eliminate 
workplace disparities tied to race, gender, and other protected characteristics. These 
bodies of research suggest that law schools aspiring to graduate practice-ready lawyers 
must not only integrate their curricula but also their faculty. Doing so means eliminating 
structural obstacles that isolate skills faculty from doctrinal faculty and dislodging 
embedded assumptions about their relative worth. Law schools that are seriously 
committed to graduating practice-ready lawyers should adopt a unified tenure system 
that hires, evaluates, and promotes all faculty based on the quality of their teaching and 
scholarship regardless of the subject of their courses or their area of research. 
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Legal education is no stranger to hierarchy. The history of the modern law school 
lies in the stratification of the legal profession during the nineteenth century. Prominent 
lawyers grew concerned about the quality of apprenticeships offered by a set of upwardly 
mobile practitioners in the United States’ emerging middle class.1 These elites feared 
that young entrants would receive only a narrow, technical indoctrination in the field.2 
Consequently, they sought to formalize legal education in a way that would ensure a 
broad exposure to legal principles and standardize access to the profession.3 Their efforts 
resulted in the first university-based law schools and the gradual waning of the 
apprenticeship model of professional training: the academic model of legal education 
was born.4 
The historical dichotomy between legal training in the field and legal learning in 
the academy endures today in the structure of the modern law school curriculum and in 
the composition of its faculty. Most schools, particularly those in the top tier, continue 
to draw a sharp divide between “doctrinal” and “skills” courses and those who teach 
them.5 A privileged group of elite-credentialed faculty cover the doctrinal courses, while 
enjoying the generous compensation and job security associated with tenure. Meanwhile 
an underclass of contract faculty shoulder the more labor-intensive skills curriculum, 
enduring lower pay and lesser status.6 These contract faculty (and their courses) are 
 
 1. See ROBERT STEVENS, LAW SCHOOL: LEGAL EDUCATION IN AMERICA FROM THE 1850S TO THE 1980S, 
at 22–24 (1983); A. Benjamin Spencer, The Law School Critique in Historical Perspective, 69 WASH. & LEE L. 
REV. 1949, 1963 (2012). These sources provide a detailed history of the development of legal education. For a 
primary account of the legal academy’s view of the relative importance of apprenticeship and higher learning as 
of the turn of the century, see Is Apprenticeship in a Law Office Desirable While Pursuing a Course of Study in 
a Law School?, reprinted in 2 THE HISTORY OF LEGAL EDUCATION IN THE UNITED STATES 880, 880–81 (Steve 
Sheppard ed., 1999). 
 2. STEVENS, supra note 1, 21–22; Spencer, supra note 1, at 1962–63. 
 3. STEVENS, supra note 1, at 25–26; Spencer, supra note 1, at 1962–64. 
 4. See generally STEVENS, supra note 1, at 7–8, 21–26 (tracing the institutionalization of legal education 
over the course of the nineteenth century). 
 5. The terms “doctrine” and “skills” are highly problematic. As this Essay describes, they assume a 
pedagogical distinction that is fundamentally untenable and embed values that subordinate some faculty based 
on the superficial classification of the courses they teach. See LINDA H. EDWARDS, THE DOCTRINE-SKILLS 
DIVIDE: LEGAL EDUCATION’S SELF-INFLICTED WOUND 6 (2017) (asserting that the project of improving student 
training “should begin by dismantling the assumption that these two categories [‘doctrine’ and ‘skills’] are 
objectively ‘true’ reflections of the natural world . . . [and r]ecognizing the artificiality of the divide”); Duncan 
Kennedy, Introduction, 73 UMKC L. REV. 231, 234 (2004) (“The problem . . . has to do with the initial set up 
of job categories—that is, with the existence of ‘doctrinal’ and LRW faculty as distinct job categories . . . .”). 
This Essay reluctantly adopts these terms when referring to the status quo curriculum and categorization of 
faculty because they so clearly evoke the divide this Essay contests. Moreover, there is no ready alternative. It 
is doubtlessly a reflection of the depth of the problem with these terms that one is at a loss for words to replace 
them. 
 6. There are many indicia of this lesser status, see Jo Anne Durako, Dismantling 
Hierarchies: Occupational Segregation of Legal Writing Faculty in Law Schools: Separate and Unequal, 73 
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siloed within the institution. They operate as a discrete, isolated subunit governed by 
different rules and subjected to different expectations than the larger professorate.7 
This organizational structure—what this Essay terms the “bifurcated faculty”—has 
been widely criticized from an equity perspective and on pedagogical grounds.8 This 
Essay does not revisit that literature but draws from it in offering a different critique: it 
considers the bifurcated faculty from the perspective of the institution as an employer, 
leveraging insights from management theory and employment discrimination 
scholarship to evaluate the bifurcated faculty as a personnel practice.9 It proceeds from 
the premises that the legal academy is committed to producing more practice-ready 
graduates and that a more comprehensive and integrated curriculum is essential to that 
 
UMKC L. REV. 253, 255–71 (2004), but the critical distinction is tenure. Only a minority of skills faculty have 
access to this form of job security and its attendant prestige. See ASS’N OF LEGAL WRITING DIRS. & LEGAL 
WRITING INST., ALWD/LWI ANNUAL LEGAL WRITING SURVEY: REPORT OF THE 2017–2018 INSTITUTIONAL 
SURVEY 58 (2018) [hereinafter 2017–2018 ALWD/LWI SURVEY], http://www.alwd.org/images/resources/
ALWD-LWI-2017-18-Institutional-Survey-Report.pdf [https://perma.cc/YZP4-DAVN] (finding that 
twenty-eight percent of legal writing professors were in traditional tenure-line positions in the 2017–18 school 
year); ROBERT R. KUEHN ET AL., CTR. FOR STUDY ON APPLIED LEGAL EDUC., THE 2016–17 SURVEY OF APPLIED 
LEGAL EDUCATION 42 (2017), http://www.cleaweb.org/resources/Documents/CSALE%20Report%
202016-17.pdf [https://perma.cc/4PL6-NT76] (finding that thirty-four percent of instructors of clinical courses 
were in tenure-line positions in the 2016–2017 school year); infra Section II. 
 7. For instance, among schools with written standards for the promotion, tenure, or retention of clinical 
faculty, seventy-two percent have standards that differ from those for doctrinal faculty. KUEHN ET AL., supra 
note 6, at 17. 
 8. The literature on this subject is too vast to fully capture here. For a sampling, see EDWARDS, supra 
note 5; Renee Nicole Allen et al., The “Pink Ghetto” Pipeline: Challenges and Opportunities for Women in 
Legal Education, 96 U. DET. MERCY L. REV. 525, 526–27 (2019); Mary Beth Beazley, Finishing the Job of 
Legal Education Reform, 51 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 275, 309–10 (2016); Catherine Martin Christopher, Putting 
Legal Writing on the Tenure Track: One School’s Perspective, 31 COLUM. J. GENDER & L. 65, 65 (2015); Kirsten 
A. Dauphinais, Sea Change: The Seismic Shift in the Legal Profession and How Legal Writing Professors Will 
Keep Legal Education Afloat in its Wake, 10 SEATTLE J. FOR SOC. JUST. 49, 71 (2011); Durako, supra note 6; 
Lucille A. Jewel, Oil and Water: How Legal Education’s Doctrine and Skills Divide Reproduces Toxic 
Hierarchies, 31 COLUM. J. GENDER & L. 111, 115 (2015); Ann C. McGinley, Reproducing Gender on Law 
School Faculties, 2009 BYU L. REV. 99, 116–17; Mitchell Nathanson, Dismantling the “Other”: Understanding 
the Nature and Malleability of Groups in the Legal Writing Professorate’s Quest for Equality, 13 LEGAL 
WRITING 79, 80 (2007); Kathryn M. Stanchi, Who Next, the Janitors? A Socio-Feminist Critique of the Status 
Hierarchy of Law Professors, 73 UMKC L. REV. 467, 467–68 (2004); Kathryn M. Stanchi & Jan M. Levine, 
Gender and Legal Writing: Law Schools’ Dirty Little Secrets, 16 BERKELEY WOMEN’S L.J. 3, 4 (2001); Kent D. 
Syverud, The Caste System and Best Practices in Legal Education, 1 J. ASS’N LEGAL WRITING DIRECTORS 12, 
14 (2002). This Essay’s critique aligns most closely with the works of Professor Linda Edwards and Professor 
Mary Beth Beazley, who have judged the bifurcated curriculum and resulting classification of faculty to be 
pedagogically suspect. See generally EDWARDS, supra note 5; Beazley, supra. 
 9. As Professor Nantiya Ruan observes, law schools are not only educational institutions but also 
employers, though they are only rarely viewed as such in scholarly discourse. Nantiya Ruan, 
Papercuts: Hierarchical Microaggressions in Law Schools, 31 HASTINGS WOMEN’’S L.J. 3, 7 (2020) 
[hereinafter Ruan, Papercuts]. To the extent they are, it is generally in the context of assessing their compliance 
with antidiscrimination mandates. See, e.g., Ann C. McGinley, Discrimination in Our Midst: Law Schools’ 
Potential Liability for Employment Practices, 14 UCLA WOMEN’S L.J. 1 (2005); Melissa Hart, Missing the 
Forest for the Trees: Gender Pay Discrimination in Academia, 91 DENV. U. L. REV. 873 (2014). In contrast, 
this Essay views the law school employer not as a potential defendant but as a strategic actor. It asks how 
employment law discourse informs our understanding of law schools’ management practices in relation to their 
institutional goals. Cf. Durako, supra note 6, at 272 (looking to equal protection law “not as legal precedent but 
as educational wisdom”). 
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mission.10 The bifurcated faculty is in tension with these institutional values, operating 
as a chronic headwind against efforts to implement them.11 
Two insights inform this assertion. First, contemporary workplace management 
practices emphasize the value of increased worker integration and work role fluidity in 
responding to changing market demands.12 The bifurcated faculty, viewed as a 
management practice, is at odds with this trend. It imposes a strict job classification 
system that impedes faculty development of the cross competencies needed to deliver an 
integrated curriculum. Second, there is increased awareness of the roles subconscious 
bias and structural discrimination play in hampering efforts to achieve greater racial and 
gender diversity in the workplace.13 By analogy, the bifurcated faculty reaffirms 
stereotypes about the comparative worthiness of doctrinal and skills faculty, operating as 
a structural barrier to faculty integration and the delivery of a curriculum that equally 
prioritizes all aspects of professional development. 
A few disclaimers are in order: First, this Essay presumes the legal academy’s 
commitment to graduating practice-ready lawyers. Certainly some law schools and 
faculty question or even reject this goal.14 This Essay addresses those who genuinely 
embrace reform. Second, this Essay acknowledges but does not consider other 
compelling reasons why law schools should reject the bifurcated faculty. There is, for 
instance, a strong normative argument that law schools, particularly those that market 
their commitment to practice readiness, should commit to equal and fair treatment of 
doctrinal and skills faculty.15 Rather this Essay makes a pragmatic claim, appealing to 
law schools’ professed self-interests. Third, and last, this Essay does not wade into the 
debate about the value of tenure. Despite chronic expressions of antitenure sentiment and 
a retreat from tenure on the part of some universities, tenure remains the gold standard 
 
 10. See generally ROY STUCKEY ET AL., BEST PRACTICES FOR LEGAL EDUCATION: A VISION AND A 
ROADMAP (2007) [hereinafter BEST PRACTICES]; WILLIAM M. SULLIVAN ET AL., EDUCATING 
LAWYERS: PREPARATION FOR THE PROFESSION OF LAW (2007) [hereinafter THE CARNEGIE REPORT]. The 
content of these reports and the practice-readiness movement more broadly have been discussed extensively 
elsewhere. See, e.g., Rachel S. Arnow-Richman, Employment as Transaction, 39 SETON HALL L. REV. 447,  
453–55 (2009); Beazley, supra note 8, at 306–08; Todd A. Berger, Three Generations and Two Tiers: How 
Participation in Law School Clinics and the Demand for “Practice-Ready” Graduates Will Impact the Faculty 
Status of Clinical Law Professors, 43 WASH. U. J.L. & POL’Y 129, 152–53 (2013); Susannah Furnish, The 
Progression of Legal Education Models: Everything Old Is New Again . . . , 6 NE. U. L.J. 7, 13–15 (2013); 
William D. Henderson, A Blueprint for Change, 40 PEPP. L. REV. 461, 501–02 (2013); Jewel, supra note 8, at 
127–33; Jerome M. Organ, Legal Education and the Legal Profession: Convergence or Divergence?, 38 OHIO 
N.U. L. REV. 885, 889–91 (2012); Nantiya Ruan, Student, Esquire?: The Practice of Law in the Collaborative 
Classroom, 20 CLINICAL L. REV. 429, 435–37 (2014) [hereinafter Ruan, Student, Esquire]. 
 11. Cf. Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 432 (1971) (holding that an employer’s use of facially 
neutral job requirements that operate as “built-in headwinds” for minority employees is actionable 
discrimination under federal law). 
 12. See infra Part II.A. 
 13. See infra Part II.B. 
 14. See, e.g., Henderson, supra note 10, at 501–03. Others may view practice readiness as a phase or 
commit to it halfheartedly. See id. 
 15. See, e.g., id. at 506; Jewel, supra note 8, at 128–33. For more articles that discuss the argument that 
law schools should commit to equal and fair treatment of doctrinal and skills faculty, see supra note 8. 
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in defining full-fledged faculty status within law schools.16 So long as that is the case, 
this Essay contends that tenure should be available on an equal basis to all faculty who 
meet its standards.17 
The remainder of this Essay proceeds as follows: Section I discusses the rise of the 
practice-readiness movement in legal education and the challenges it poses. Rather than 
seek holistic reforms, law schools have long relied on isolated programs staffed by 
lower-status, contract faculty to provide practical training. Section II considers the result 
of this practice—the bifurcated faculty—as a managerial choice and a structural feature 
of work. It argues that faculty bifurcation undermines institutional efforts to integrate the 
curriculum and reifies the historical devaluation of skills education, precluding 
transformative change. Finally, Section III calls on the legal academy to align their 
workplace practices with their professed goals by adopting a uniform system of 
tenure-line employment. True curricular integration can be best achieved where the 
contributions of all faculty, to both innovative teaching and impactful scholarship, are 
equally encouraged and rewarded. 
I. THE INTEGRATION MANDATE 
Criticism of legal education is as old as legal education itself. A common theme is 
the need to enhance law graduates’ practice readiness. Assessments of institutional 
performance generally praise law schools’ ability to train students to “think like a 
lawyer.”18 However, law schools receive poor marks when it comes to inculcating the 
practical, ethical, and professional dimensions of lawyering.19 In effect, students 
graduate knowing a great deal about the law but very little about what to do with it.20 
The most recent assessments of legal education add a particular pedagogical 
proscription to this critique. In 2007, the Carnegie Foundation and the Clinical Legal 
Education Association published reports that called on law schools to deliver integrated 
 
 16. See Stanchi, supra note 8, at 485 (labeling tenure “the quintessential social reward of the academy”). 
Ambivalence about tenure in law school is illustrated most starkly in the American Bar Association’s recent 
about-face on the continued necessity of tenure for accreditation. See Karen Sloan, ABA Council Abandons Bid 
to Drop Tenure Requirement, NAT’L L.J. (Mar. 17, 2014), http://ncforaj.org/wp-content/uploads/
2014/03/NLJ-3-18-14-ABA-Council-Abandons-Bid-to-Drop-Tenure-Requirement.pdf [https://perma.cc/
VFN5-U99R]. 
 17. See Beazley, supra note 8, at 278 (asserting that “[a]ll full-time faculty deserve the protections of 
tenure regardless of their method of teaching or the subject area of their courses”). 
 18. E.g., THE CARNEGIE REPORT, supra note 10, at 185–86. But see Kristen Holmquist, Challenging 
Carnegie, 61 J. LEGAL EDUC. 353, 357 (2012) (questioning whether law schools truly excel in developing 
cognitive skills and suggesting that the traditional “case method” style of teaching diminishes student 
opportunity “to engage in sophisticated higher-order thinking about law and policy, problems, and goals, and 
about potential paths, obstructions, and solutions”). 
 19. See THE CARNEGIE REPORT, supra note 10, at 187–88; AM. BAR ASS’N, SECTION OF LEGAL EDUC. & 
ADMISSIONS TO THE BAR, LEGAL EDUCATION AND PROFESSIONAL DEVELOPMENT—AN EDUCATIONAL 
CONTINUUM, REPORT OF THE TASK FORCE ON LAW SCHOOLS AND THE PROFESSION: NARROWING THE GAP 4–6 
(1992), http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/publications/misc/legal_education/2013_legal_
education_and_professional_development_maccrate_report).pdf [https://perma.cc/8JKW-7JR2]. 
 20. See id. at 187 (noting that the case method style presents a “deliberate simplification” and leaves 
students unprepared to deal with the “complexity of actual situations that involve full-dimensional people”). 
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learning experiences.21 Law schools must create contexts that place students in the role 
of the lawyer, forcing them to bring to bear multiple competencies in a single learning 
environment. This integration should encapsulate what the Carnegie Report calls “the 
cognitive, practical, and ethical-social” apprenticeships that together compose 
professional mastery.22 In other words, students must learn “experientially” in situations 
that simulate or expose them to actual practice, providing the opportunity not only to 
think like a lawyer but to behave like one.23 
This focus on experiential learning poses a direct challenge to the organizing 
framework that defines contemporary legal education. Over the course of the twentieth 
century, law schools developed courses and programs to deliver the practical training 
and professional exposure that had long been lacking in the standard curriculum.24 
Today, virtually all law schools house sophisticated legal writing programs, in-house 
clinics, and externship programs that offer rich opportunities for experiential learning.25 
Yet as a matter of both history and design, these educational opportunities exist outside 
the mainstream curriculum in which cognitive learning still predominates. As a 
consequence, the courses at the core of the law school experience inculcate only a 
handful of the professional competencies educators and practitioners have identified as 
essential to success in practice.26 Meanwhile the balance of students’ professional 
training occurs in programmatic silos on the “fringes” of the curriculum.27 
Adding to this division is the distinctly lower status afforded to faculty who teach 
in these programs. Despite some movement in recent years, the vast majority of skills 
faculty serve in short- or long-term contract positions. A recent survey of clinicians 
reveals that only thirty-four percent of full-time clinical faculty hold tenure-line 
positions: twenty-seven percent in traditional tenure systems and twelve percent in 
clinic-specific systems.28 The majority hold contract positions of between one and five 
years.29 A recent survey of legal writing programs reveals that only twenty-eight percent 
 
 21. BEST PRACTICES, supra note 10, at 6; THE CARNEGIE REPORT, supra note 10, at 185. 
 22. THE CARNEGIE REPORT, supra note 10, at 191–92. 
 23. David I. C. Thomson, Defining Experiential Legal Education, 1 J. EXPERIENTIAL LEARNING 1, 20 
(2014) (describing experiential learning as “methods of instruction that regularly or primarily place students in 
the role of attorneys”). 
 24. THE CARNEGIE REPORT, supra note 10, at 189–91 (describing this approach to institutional reform). 
 25. See Thomson, supra note 23, at 3, 20 (citing simulations, clinics, and externships as key examples of 
experiential learning). For some especially rich examples of experiential learning that combine classroom 
instruction, advocacy, drafting and public service, see Nantiya Ruan, Experiential Learning in the First-Year 
Curriculum: The Public Interest Partnership, 8 LEGAL COMM. & RHETORIC 191, 204–08 (2011); Ruan, Student, 
Esquire, supra note 10, at 442–47. 
 26. See Neil Hamilton, Law Firm Competency Models & Student Professional Success: Building on a 
Foundation of Professional Formation/Professionalism, 11 U. ST. THOMAS L.J. 6, 7–9 (2013) (reporting on 
competency rubrics that law firms have developed for associate hiring and performance); Marjorie M. Shultz & 
Sheldon Zedeck, Predicting Lawyer Effectiveness: Broadening the Basis for Law School Admission Decisions, 
36 L. & SOC. INQUIRY 620, 620 (2011) (considering measures of competency in the context of law school 
admissions). 
 27. Ruan, Papercuts, supra note 9, at 15; see also THE CARNEGIE REPORT, supra note 10, at 191 
(criticizing law schools for taking an “additive” rather than “integrative” approach to delivering professional 
skills and values training). 
 28. KUEHN ET AL., supra note 6, at 25. 
 29. Id. 
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of law schools employ any legal research and writing (LRW) faculty in traditional 
tenure-line positions, while eight percent employ at least one LRW faculty member in a 
program-specific tenure-line position.30 The remaining schools employed LRW faculty 
exclusively in short- or long-term contract positions.31 Faculty serving in contract 
positions generally are not expected to contribute to the legal academy’s scholarly 
mission and lack access to the privileges and security associated with tenure.32 
These stark differences in status have been institutionalized in the American Bar 
Association (ABA) accreditation standards. ABA Standard 405(b) requires each law 
school to have an “announced policy” regarding academic freedom and tenure.33 Law 
schools generally interpret this to mean that full-time faculty must be tenure eligible 
unless they fall outside of Standard 405(b). Indeed, the ABA Standards explicitly carve 
out two categories of professors that need not have access to tenure status: clinical and 
legal writing faculty.34 ABA Standard 405(c) allows law schools to provide clinicians a 
status “reasonably similar to tenure,” defined as a series of long-term contracts of five or 
more years that are “presumptively renewable” or a similar process “sufficient to ensure 
academic freedom.”35 Legal writing faculty command even less protection. Standard 
405(d) requires only that law schools provide legal writing professors “such security of 
position and other rights and privileges of faculty membership as may be necessary to 
(1) attract and retain a faculty that is well qualified to provide legal writing 
instruction . . . , and (2) safeguard academic freedom.”36 
The formalization and sanctioning of these status differences ironically occur in 
tandem with a renewed interest in legal education reform and an express commitment to 
experiential learning. In 2014, the ABA revised its standards for law school accreditation 
to improve and measure schools’ success in graduating practice-ready lawyers.37 ABA 
 
 30. 2017–2018 ALWD/LWI SURVEY, supra note 6, at 58. These numbers are somewhat misleading in 
that they capture any school that employs at least one LRW faculty member in a tenure-line position. Thirty-two 
percent of responding schools with traditional tenure and twenty-seven percent of responding schools with 
programmatic tenure indicated that the only LRW faculty members within their institutions who held those 
positions were LRW program directors. Id. at 59. 
 31. Id. at 58 (reporting that forty-three percent of responding schools employed faculty in long-term 
405(c) contracts, eighteen percent in long-term contracts without 405(c) status, and forty-one percent in 
short-term contracts). 
 32. See KUEHN ET AL., supra note 6, at 47 (reporting that only thirty-seven percent of full-time clinical 
faculty were required to produce scholarship as part of their job and less than forty percent were entitled to 
sabbaticals or research leave). 
 33. AM. BAR ASS’N, ABA STANDARDS AND RULES OF PROCEDURE FOR APPROVAL OF LAW SCHOOLS 
2019–2020, at 27 (2019), http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/administrative/legal_education_and_
admissions_to_the_bar/standards/2019-2020/2019-2020-aba-standards-and-rules-of-procedure.pdf [https://
perma.cc/G833-V7US]. 
 34. Id. 
 35. Id. at 27–28. 
 36. Id. at 27. Professor Beazley describeds Standard 405(d) as the ultimate “catch-22”: legal writing 
faculty “must either leave their jobs (to show that the job conditions were not sufficient to ‘retain’ them), or 
argue that they themselves are not ‘well qualified’ in legal writing instruction.” Beazley, supra note 8, at 287. 
 37. See Standards Review Comm., Am. Bar Ass’n, Overview of Changes to the Standard for Approval of 
Law Schools, A.B.A., https://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/administrative/legal_education_and_
admissions_to_the_bar/council_reports_and_resolutions/overview_of_changes.pdf [https://perma.cc/5S3K-
XNWN] (last visited May 1, 2020). 
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Standard 301 mandates that law schools establish learning outcomes designed to prepare 
students “for admission to the bar and for effective, ethical, and responsible participation 
as members of the legal profession.”38 The new standards specifically require that law 
students receive six credit hours of experiential education.39 Thus, law schools and their 
accreditors are embracing the importance of experiential education and an integrated 
curriculum while simultaneously condoning the lesser treatment of faculty essential to 
fulfilling that mission.40 
II. INSTITUTIONAL CHOICES AT ODDS WITH INSTITUTIONAL GOALS 
The previous Section discussed the increasing importance of experiential learning 
in the legal academy and the differential status of faculty engaged in this pedagogy. This 
Section considers that contradiction from the perspective of the law school as employer. 
It argues that the bifurcated faculty is a managerial failure that jeopardizes institutional 
goals. The bifurcated faculty impedes managerial flexibility, limiting law schools’ ability 
to adjust their curricula in the face of changing market demands.41 At the same time, it 
undermines the purported equality of doctrinal learning and skills training by reifying 
stereotypes about the value and competence of skills faculty.42 In these ways, the 
bifurcated faculty precludes the development of the type of fully integrated experiential 
curriculum that the practice-readiness movement envisions. 
A. Silos and Flexibility 
In the broader labor market, workplace silos are the antithesis of flexibility. 
Contemporary employers, seeking to remain competitive in an increasingly globalized 
economy, prize the ability to deploy and adjust their workforces quickly and nimbly.43 
From this perspective, law schools’ adherence to the bifurcated faculty is a throwback to 
a time when the academy could count on steady demand for its product. In a world in 
which expectations about the content and value of a legal education are in flux, law 
schools need to leverage faculty resources dynamically. 
 
 38. AM. BAR ASS’N, supra note 33, at 15. ABA Standard 302 provides specifics on “minimum” outcomes 
that law schools “shall establish.” Id. 
 39. Id. at 16. ABA Standard 303(a)(3) provides that “[a] law school shall offer a curriculum that requires 
each student to satisfactorily complete at least . . . one or more experiential course(s) totaling at least six credit 
hours.” Id. 
 40. See Beazley, supra note 8, at 285–86 (observing that while “the ABA [standards] say[] that teaching 
legal writing is important. . . . [T]he people who teach it are apparently far less important”); Ruan, Papercuts, 
supra note 9, at 15 (noting that while “law schools are strongly encouraged to provide more experiential learning 
opportunities . . . , [they] systemically marginalize the very faculty [who] teach[] those skills”). 
 41. See infra Part II.A. 
 42. See infra Part II.B. 
 43. See KATHERINE V. W. STONE, FROM WIDGETS TO DIGITS: EMPLOYMENT REGULATION FOR THE 
CHANGING WORKPLACE 67–72, 92–94 (2004) [hereinafter STONE, WIDGETS TO DIGITS] (describing the 
evolution of flexibility-focused management practices in the late twentieth century and the concomitant rise of 
the “boundaryless” career). Professor Katherine Stone’s important monograph on the changing nature of 
employment relationships and her related articles incorporate the key business management and sociological 
literature on this shift. This Part draws heavily on her work. 
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This is borne out in the literature on changing employment practices, which depicts 
a move from rigidity to fluidity in workplace management strategies. Industrial 
management practices from the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries emphasized 
clearly defined workplace roles.44 This made sense given the strength and stability of 
large regional employers in a predominantly industrial economy.45 For much of the 
twentieth century, an individual spent the bulk of his or her working life with a single 
company, at a single physical location, and advanced along a defined career path.46 Early 
industrial engineer Frederick Taylor famously developed the theory of scientific 
management that systemized work routines and job tasks into a predesigned 
progression.47 His approach divided production into discrete tasks and assigned them to 
workers in sharply differentiated job categories.48 These workers relied on the discrete 
skill set associated with their job positions to advance along defined career ladders.49 
Pathways were fixed, and lateral movement was discouraged.50 
The bifurcated faculty is reminiscent of this managerial model. The academy has 
divided the production of legal education into two constituent parts—the teaching of 
legal principles and the inculcation of lawyering skills—which are assigned to distinct 
classes of employees who operate in separate silos within an institution.51 These 
employees are evaluated and rewarded differently and governed by different policies and 
procedures: Doctrinal faculty are judged principally on their scholarship and proceed 
through a faculty-governed tenure system that confers maximum security and 
independence.52 Skills faculty are judged almost exclusively on their teaching and 
service and are typically eligible for a series of successive contractual appointments, 
usually at the dean’s discretion.53 There is minimal professional interaction between 
 
 44. See id. at 31–37. 
 45. See id. 
 46. See id. at 37–38. For additional employment law scholarship describing the rise of the “career” model 
of employment and its implications for employee job security rights, see, for example, Kenneth G. Dau-Schmidt, 
Employment in the New Age of Trade and Technology: Implications for Labor and Employment Law, 76 IND. 
L.J. 1, 6 (2001); Matthew W. Finkin, The Bureaucratization of Work: Employer Policies and Contract Law, 
1986 WIS. L. REV. 733, 740–43; Stewart J. Schwab, Life-Cycle Justice: Accommodating Just Cause and 
Employment at Will, 92 MICH. L. REV. 8, 14–15 (1993); and Katherine V. W. Stone, The New Psychological 
Contract: Implications of the Changing Workplace for Labor and Employment Law, 48 UCLA L. REV. 519, 
535–39 (2001) [hereinafter Stone, Psychological Contract]. 
 47. See STONE, WIDGETS TO DIGITS, supra note 43, at 31–37; see also PETER CAPPELLI, THE NEW DEAL 
AT WORK: MANAGING THE MARKET-DRIVEN WORKFORCE 59–64 (1999). 
 48. See STONE, WIDGETS TO DIGITS, supra note 43, at 34–35. 
 49. Id. at 42–43. 
 50. See id. 
 51. Jessica Erickson, Experiential Education in the Lecture Hall, 6 NE. U. L.J. 87, 87 (2013); see also 
Jewel, supra note 8, at 112–14; Stanchi, supra note 8, at 487. For more articles that discuss how legal education 
is divided into separate silos, see supra note 8. 
 52. See Spencer, supra note 1, at 2048; Stanchi, supra note 8, at 479–85. 
 53. KUEHN ET AL., supra note 6, at 15 (finding thirty percent of full-time faculty teaching in a law clinic 
or field placement course are in presumptively renewable long-term contracts); Bryan L. Adamson et al., Clinical 
Faculty in the Legal Academy: Hiring, Promotion and Retention, 62 J. LEGAL EDUC. 115, 129 (2012) [hereinafter 
Adamson et al., Clinical Faculty] (finding seventy-four percent of clinical faculty on a clinical-faculty tenure 
track reported that their standards for promotion and retention place a greater emphasis on their teaching as 
compared to doctrinal faculty on a traditional tenure track). 
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these categories of faculty, whose responsibilities are considered independent of each 
other and who have almost no ability to leave one track in favor of the other.54 
In the broader labor market, however, employers have moved away from strict job 
classifications with assigned roles in favor of more flexible management practices.55 In 
the contemporary service- and information-driven economy,56 work is less amenable to 
dissection and requires greater cross collaboration.57 Adaptability is key. Global 
competition and the pace of change mean companies must react quickly to fluctuating 
market demands.58 Some have responded to these dynamics by adopting new 
management strategies that increase teamwork and foster greater innovation.59 This 
includes dismantling fixed hierarchies and career ladders in favor of work teams in which 
supervision is diffuse and employees can develop and deploy diverse skill sets.60 These 
companies promote and prize so-called organizational citizenship behavior—the desire 
and capacity of employees to reach beyond their assigned roles, adding value to the 
company while evolving professionally.61 
That is not to say that new economy management practices are necessarily a 
positive development. An attendant concern is the rise of independent contractor 
arrangements, which serve employers’ interests in efficiently fulfilling short-term labor 
needs, but diminish workers’ ability to access the already limited legal protections 
 
 54. To be sure, faculty from time-to-time break out of their assigned silo to teach on the “other” side of 
the curriculum. But the way this occurs is telling. When strapped for coverage in doctrinal courses, institutions 
may tap skills faculty, who, owing to their lesser pay and lack of job security, may be willing to teach an overload 
for additional compensation or feel unable to decline (or both). On the other hand, if doctrinal faculty teach (or 
develop) a skills course, it is often the product of idiosyncratic interest—the faculty member’s pet project. In 
either case, the cross-over is treated as an exception and the preexisting role division remains intact. See Stanchi, 
supra note 8, at 473 (describing how in the case of legal writing faculty it is the professor’s “membership in a 
particular group, as opposed to merit-based factors . . . that dictates access to opportunities”). Situations in which 
faculty consistently teach on both sides of the curriculum or leave one silo permanently in favor of the other are 
exceedingly rare and, in the latter case, even notorious. See Deborah Jones Merritt, Crossing the Divide, in THE 
DOCTRINE-SKILLS DIVIDE: LEGAL EDUCATION’S SELF-INFLICTED WOUND, supra note 5, at 347, 347–58 
(describing the author’s migration from podium teaching to clinical supervision). 
 55. See RICHARD SENNETT, THE CORROSION OF CHARACTER: THE PERSONAL CONSEQUENCES OF WORK 
IN THE NEW CAPITALISM 51 (1998) (describing the modern approach of “flexible specialization” as “the 
antithesis of the system of production embodied in [early industrial management]”); STONE, WIDGETS TO DIGITS, 
supra note 43, at 92–94. 
 56. For an explanation of the movement from a manufacturing to a service-oriented economy, see 
STEPHEN A. HERZENBERG ET AL., NEW RULES FOR A NEW ECONOMY: EMPLOYMENT AND OPPORTUNITY IN 
POSTINDUSTRIAL AMERICA 1–3 (1998). 
 57. See CAPPELLI, supra note 47, at 146–47 (noting the shift in the late nineties from narrow job 
descriptions to autonomous teams and job rotation, resulting in an increase in cross-training). 
 58. See id. at 59 (attributing changes in employment practices to increasingly competitive product markets 
and pressures to exploit market niches); Stone, Psychological Contract, supra note 46, at 549 (noting pressures 
caused by international trade and global competition in explaining changing management trends). 
 59. CAPPELLI, supra note 47, at 146–48. 
 60. See id. (noting an increase in workers performing broader tasks and a decrease in supervisory positions 
in white-collar work environments). 
 61. See STONE, WIDGETS TO DIGITS, supra note 43, at 94–96 (defining “organizational citizenship 
behavior” as “discretionary behavior that goes beyond the requirements of specific role definitions and that is 
not rewarded through the formal reward structure of the firm”). 
2020] INTEGRATED LEARNING, INTEGRATED FACULTY 755 
afforded to traditional employees.62 Universities are arguably guilty of this practice with 
respect to their use of adjunct faculty, who perform essential teaching work but lack the 
benefits of employment status.63 This Essay, however, addresses law schools’ ability to 
develop and deploy their core faculty—individuals who serve full time and have full 
employment status but are treated unequally despite their equal role in the in the 
educational mission.  
In other words, integtrating skills faculty makes business sense. As recent events 
have shown, the demand for legal education is not static, and legal education cannot 
afford to be. In the wake of the Great Recession, law schools faced low enrollment and 
reduced demand for new lawyers.64 Many law schools sought to distinguish themselves, 
claiming to provide a more practice-oriented learning experience that would enhance 
student marketability upon graduation.65 While the peak of the 2010 enrollment crisis 
 
 62. See Stephen F. Befort, Labor and Employment Law at the Millennium: A Historical Review and 
Critical Assessment, 43 B.C. L. REV. 351, 417 (2002); Stephen F. Befort, Revisiting the Black Hole of Workplace 
Regulation: A Historical and Comparative Perspective of Contingent Work, 24 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 
153, 158 (2003); V.B. Dubal, Wage Slave or Entrepreneur?: Contesting the Dualism of Legal Worker Identities, 
105 CALIF. L. REV. 65, 65 (2017); Laurie E. Leader, Whose Time Is It Anyway?: Evolving Notions of Work in 
the 21st Century, 6 BELMONT L. REV. 96, 99–100 (2019); Orla O’Callaghan, Comment, Independent Contractor 
Injustice: The Case for Amending Discriminatory Discrimination Laws, 55 HOUS. L. REV. 1187, 1188–91 
(2018). Several recent state legislative initiatives have sought to address this problem, either by expanding the 
definition of employee or by extending some employment benefits to workers without formal employment status. 
See, e.g., Act of Sept. 18, 2019, ch. 296, 2019 Cal. Stat. 2888 (codifying the common law “ABC” test of 
employment status that limits employers’ abilities to classify workers as independent contractors); S. 67, 218th 
Leg., Reg. Sess. (N.J. 2018) (proposing the Portable Benefits Act for Independent Contractors, which creates a 
system of portable benefits for independent workers). For more information about such efforts, see Ekaterina 
(Kate) Napalkova & Katrine Magas, Landmark Bill Passes: California Codifies “ABC” Test for Worker 
Classification, NAT’L L. REV. (Sept. 16, 2019), http://www.natlawreview.com/article/landmark-bill-passes-
california-codifies-abc-test-worker-classification [https://perma.cc/2CWZ-AVT2]; and NJ Benefits Bill May 
Deter Business with Contractors, LAW360 (Dec. 13, 2019, 5:18 PM), http://www.law360.com/articles/1224065/
nj-benefits-bill-may-deter-business-with-contractors [https://perma.cc/3J66-MB7F]. In what might hopefully 
model a change for the future, Congress recently extended federal unemployment benefits to “gig” workers 
dislocated as a result of the COVID-19 pandemic. See Coronavirus Aid, Relief, and Economic Security Act 
(“CARES” Act), Pub. L. No. 116-136, § 2102 (2020); Heather Long, “Paid Sick Leave: Who Gets It During the 
Coronavirus Outbreak,” WASH. POST (Mar. 17, 2020, 11:18 AM), http://www.washingtonpost.com/business/
2020/03/16/paid-sick-leave-coronavirus-house-bill/ [https://perma.cc/3PX9-GW44]. 
 63. This is a well-known problem at the college level. While law school adjuncts by and large are 
esteemed, well-established practitioners who teach by choice, college adjuncts often are recent PhDs without 
access to secure employment in fields where academic jobs are scarce and poorly paid. See, e.g., Kevin 
Birmingham, ‘The Great Shame of Our Profession’: How the Humanities Survive on Exploitation, CHRON. 
HIGHER EDUC. (Feb. 12, 2017), http://www.chronicle.com/article/The-Great-Shame-of-Our/239148 [https://
perma.cc/AJ2G-PVN5]. 
 64. Jane Croft, Law School Admissions Collapse Continues, FIN. TIMES (Nov. 20, 2016), 
http://www.ft.com/content/4ddb437e-9ace-11e6-8f9b-70e3cabccfae [https://perma.cc/RAV2-EVVG]; see also 
Donald J. Polden, Leading Institutional Change: Law Schools and Legal Education in a Time of Crisis, 83 TENN. 
L. REV. 949, 949–50 (2016); Samantha Robbins, From Big Law to Legal Education: The Trickle Down Effect 
of the Recession, 27 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 841, 841 (2014) (discussing the effects of the recession on the legal 
market and how law schools should adapt to survive). 
 65. See Margaret Loftus, Law Schools Innovate with Hands-On Learning, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP. 
(Mar. 30, 2016), http://www.usnews.com/education/best-graduate-schools/top-law-schools/articles/2016-03-
30/law-schools-innovate-with-hands-on-learning [https://perma.cc/H2UE-9PP8]; see also Cynthia Batt, A 
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has passed,66 the next downturn looms. As this Essay goes to press, law schools and the 
legal profession are reeling from the economic effects of the COVID-19 pandemic.67 It 
is too soon to know the full impact on the legal market and law school enrollment, but it 
would be wise to anticipate reduced job opportunities for the immediate future.68 Law 
schools that promise to provide a competitive edge will have to deliver. 
Faculty silos are artifacts limiting the type of curricular innovation and faculty 
collaboration that law schools most need to provide a twenty-first-century education. 
Law schools should take a page from the contemporary business management playbook 
and seek ways to diversify skill sets, cross-train, and integrate faculty across formal lines. 
The most recent assessments of legal education critique not only the academy’s weak 
commitment to skills training but specifically its disaggregation of the curriculum.69 True 
preparation for practice requires students to master not only the core components of the 
profession individually but also the ability to bring them all to bear simultaneously in a 
realistic professional context.70 Law schools cannot excel in delivering that type of 
integrated learning experience without integrated faculty. 
B. Silos and Stereotypes 
The politics that underlie the bifurcated faculty add to the problem. The two   
silos—doctrine and skills—that make up this system are far from neutral. They embed 
deeply held assumptions about who and what are most valuable to the legal education 
enterprise—namely, the delivery of doctrinal content by tenure-line scholars teaching 
traditional courses primarily through Socratic pedagogy.71 This belief system and its 
 
Practice Continuum: Integrating Experiential Education into the Curriculum, 7 ELON L. REV. 119, 120–21 
(2015). 
 66. See New Data Confirm Boost in Law School Attendance, A.B.A., http://www.americanbar.org/news/
abanews/aba-news-archives/2018/12/new-data-confirms-boost-law-school/ [https://perma.cc/JPP8-WJRM] 
(last visited May 1, 2020). 
 67. See, e.g., James Mackintosh, Coronavirus Scars Might Weaken Economy for Years to Come, WALL 
STREET J. (Apr. 12, 2020, 9:00 AM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/coronavirus-scars-might-weaken-economy-
for-years-to-come-11586696401 [https://perma.cc/DL6S-6MMQ]. 
 68. See Casey Sullivan, Law Firms Are Starting To Cancel Summer Associate Classes Entirely as They 
Scramble to Cut Costs. Here’s What We Know So Far., BUS. INSIDER (Apr. 11, 2020, 10:13 AM), http://
www.businessinsider.com/two-big-law-firms-cancel-summer-associate-programs-2020-4 [https://perma.cc/
G5PL-ZY3T]; Meghan Tribe et al., The Pandemic Is Putting Law Students’ Futures on Hold, BLOOMBERG 
BUSINESSWEEK (Apr. 14, 2020, 5:00 AM), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2020-04-14/coronavirus-
pandemic-is-putting-law-students-futures-on-hold [https://perma.cc/85S7-VVHD]. On the other hand, it is 
difficult to predict the effects on admissions. Despite fewer legal jobs, the down economy may create an 
incentive for college graduates to apply to law schools rather than navigate a weak job market. See Gabriel Kuris, 
The Impact of the Coronavirus on Legal Education, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP. (Mar. 23, 2020), 
http://www.usnews.com/education/blogs/law-admissions-lowdown/articles/the-impact-of-the-coronavirus-on-l
egal-education [https://perma.cc/X6NG-SCA5]. 
 69. See, e.g., THE CARNEGIE REPORT, supra note 10, at 58–59 (noting that because case-method 
instruction and clinical learning are not “explicitly connected . . . , few law schools achieve the full impact that 
an integrated ensemble [educational experience] could provide”). 
 70. See Arnow-Richman, supra note 10, at 455 (“A hallmark of the successful professional is the ability 
to integrate and bring to bear multiple competencies—expert knowledge, practical experience, and moral 
judgment—in circumstances of uncertainty and complexity.”). 
 71. Dean Kent Syverud cunningly describes these faculty as the “Brahmins” in the law school “caste 
system.” Syverud, supra note 8, at 14; see also Beazley, supra note 8, at 276; Stanchi, supra note 8, at 476 n.62. 
2020] INTEGRATED LEARNING, INTEGRATED FACULTY 757 
interrelationship with the bifurcated faculty galvanize faculty and intensify barriers to 
integration. 
The concept of “second generation” discrimination, which animates much of 
contemporary antidiscrimination literature, offers a useful analogy for understanding 
how embedded beliefs can perpetuate historical disadvantage and undermine progressive 
goals.72 Second generation literature seeks to account for the persistence of inequality 
tied to race, gender, and other protected characteristics despite not only a decline in overt 
discrimination but also, in many organizations (including law schools), an expressed 
commitment to diversity.73 One explanation is that subconscious stereotyping, occurring 
within and legitimized by established institutional structures, prevents diverse employees 
from achieving their full potential, which reinforces the underlying beliefs.74 It is now 
widely accepted that implicit biases based on social stereotypes subconsciously affect 
how people perceive, assess, categorize, store, and ultimately retrieve information.75 Put 
simply, our brains rely on heuristics to make sense of a complicated world, which 
predisposes us to interpret and implement information in ways that confirm preexisting 
expectations and experiences.76 This, in turn, adversely affects how people view and treat 
 
 72. Susan Sturm, Second Generation Employment Discrimination: A Structural Approach, 101 COLUM. 
L. REV. 458, 468–69 (2001). Professor Stephanie Bornstein describes “second generation” discrimination as  
discrimination [that] involves bias that is more subtle, suppressed, and implicit—as opposed to 
explicit or recognized by those who hold it . . . . [It] may also be diffuse and structural, embedded in 
a variety of workplace practices . . . . Lastly, second generation discrimination may be relational, 
interactional, and contextual, meaning that it is fostered by workplace relationships and culture. 
See Stephanie Bornstein, Unifying Antidiscrimination Law Through Stereotype Theory, 20 LEWIS & CLARK L. 
REV. 919, 930 (2016). 
 73. See, e.g., TRISTIN K. GREEN, DISCRIMINATION LAUNDERING: THE RISE OF ORGANIZATIONAL 
INNOCENCE AND THE CRISIS OF EQUAL OPPORTUNITY LAW 26 (2017) [hereinafter GREEN, LAUNDERING]; Laura 
T. Kessler, Employment Discrimination and the Domino Effect, 44 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 1041, 1050 (2017) 
[hereinafter Kessler, Domino Effect]; Sturm, supra note 72, at 468–69. 
 74. See Kessler, Domino Effect, supra note 73, at 1089–91; Linda Hamilton Krieger, The Content of Our 
Categories: A Cognitive Bias Approach to Discrimination and Equal Employment Opportunity, 47 STAN. L. 
REV. 1161, 1169–70 (1995). That is not to suggest that subconscious bias is the sole explanation for the limited 
success of diversity initiatives. Another strand of antidiscrimination scholarship suggests that even 
well-intentioned organizations tend to pursue mere symbolic compliance with antidiscrimination laws rather 
than disrupt the established organizational hierarchy. See, e.g., LAUREN B. EDELMAN, WORKING LAW: COURTS, 
CORPORATIONS, AND SYMBOLIC CIVIL RIGHTS 3–18 (2016); Alexandra Kalev et al., Best Practices or Best 
Guesses? Assessing the Efficacy of Corporate Affirmative Action and Diversity Policies, 71 AM. SOC. REV. 589, 
591–92 (2006). 
 75. Kreiger, supra note 74, at 1188. Professor Linda Hamilton Kreiger’s article is the seminal article 
incorporating the social science literature into the employment discrimination field, see id., but numerous others 
have drawn on these ideas in developing a contemporary account of discriminatory bias in the workplace and 
the limits of existing law. See, e.g., Samuel R. Bagenstos, The Structural Turn and the Limits of 
Antidiscrimination Law, 94 CALIF. L. REV. 1 (2006); Katharine T. Bartlett, Making Good on Good 
Intentions: The Critical Role of Motivation in Reducing Implicit Workplace Discrimination, 95 VA. L. REV. 1893 
(2009); Melissa Hart, Subjective Decisionmaking and Unconscious Discrimination, 56 ALA. L. REV. 741 (2005); 
Kessler, Domino Effect, supra note 73. For an especially rich account of the cause and effects of subconscious 
racial bias looking beyond the context of employment, see Jerry Kang, Trojan Horses of Race, 118 HARV. L. 
REV. 1489 (2005), which focuses on the role of news media and crime reporting. 
 76. As Professor Laura Kessler explains, “‘[I]mplicit’ bias refers to prejudiced judgments that may affect 
our understandings, actions, and decisions. It is a type of cognitive shortcut that occurs when our brains make 
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“out-group” members—those whose characteristics differ from theirs or others in the 
relevant dataset.77 In this way, reflexive assumptions about who is and is not capable of 
success become self-fulfilling prophecies. 
The bifurcated faculty is precisely such a bias-reinforcing structure. This does not 
mean that the bifurcated faculty discriminates based on gender or other protected 
characteristics, although the preponderance of women in contract positions is due in part 
to the dynamics described here.78 Rather the bifurcated faculty is rooted in longstanding, 
deeply embedded stereotypes about the academic rigor of skills courses and the 
intellectual capacity of skills teachers.79 The interaction between these ingrained beliefs 
and the personnel practices they have engendered ensures that skills education remains 
segregated and devalued along with those who teach it.80 
Subsumed within the bifurcated faculty are three interrelated personnel practices 
that reflect and reaffirm the secondary status of skills faculty: (1) the ex ante division of 
faculty into doctrinal and skills professors, (2) the pairing of only doctrinal teaching with 
scholarship expectations, and (3) the prioritization of academic criteria in hiring doctrinal 
faculty. Together these practices embody a set of first principles about faculty hiring and 
the terms of their employment that seem both natural and necessary but in fact are 
institutional choices at odds with institutional goals.81 
These three practices have historical roots. The first practice—the division of 
faculty into doctrinal and skills professors—flows from the division within the 
curriculum itself, a product of legal education’s peculiar evolution. As previously noted, 
the contemporary academic law school evolved in the late nineteenth century as a 
supplement to the contextual learning afforded through apprenticeship in the field.82 The 
division of doctrine from skills was thus functional, not instrumental. Had history been 
 
quick judgments and assessments of people and situations, informed by our background, cultural environment, 
and personal experiences.” Kessler, Domino Effect, supra note 73, at 1056 (footnote omitted). 
 77. See id. at 1063 n.71. 
 78. Many scholars have critically engaged the gendered nature of skills positions, particularly in the area 
of legal writing, which has been labeled a “pink ghetto.” Jo Anne Durako, Second-Class Citizens in the Pink 
Ghetto: Gender Bias in Legal Writing, 50 J. LEGAL EDUC. 562 (2000); see also Allen et al., supra note 8, at 525; 
Beazley, supra note 8, at 290–92; McGinley, supra note 8, at 99; Stanchi & Levine, supra note 8, at 4, 8. While 
skills faculty are predominately female, they are also almost entirely white. The undervalued nature of skills 
positions poses a further distinct challenge to professors of color who risk a double stigma. See Beazley, supra 
note 8, at 292–94; Jewel, supra note 8, at 122. 
 79. For an especially painful illustration of this perception and its effects, see Linda L. Berger, When Less 
Is More: An Ideological Rhetorical Analysis of Selected ABA Standards on Curricula and Faculty, in THE 
DOCTRINE-SKILLS DIVIDE: LEGAL EDUCATION’S SELF-INFLICTED WOUND, supra note 5, at 209, 210 (describing 
the ABA’s rule that a non-tenure-line skills professor counted as seven-tenths of a tenure-line professor as 
“reminiscent of the Constitution’s equation for counting slaves”). 
 80. For a discussion of the roles that employer personnel practices and other organizational structures 
play in enabling the operation of subconscious bias, see, for example, Tristin K. Green, Discrimination in 
Workplace Dynamics: Toward a Structural Account of Disparate Treatment Theory, 38 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. 
REV. 91, 104–08, 145–48 (2003); and Tristin K. Green, Work Culture and Discrimination, 93 CALIF. L. REV. 
623, 650 (2005). 
 81. Professor Edwards neatly captured this irony by describing the curricular separation of skills and 
doctrine in the title of her book, The Doctrine-Skills Divide: Legal Education’s Self-Inflicted Wound. EDWARDS, 
supra note 5. 
 82. See supra note 1 and accompanying text. 
2020] INTEGRATED LEARNING, INTEGRATED FACULTY 759 
different or the apprenticeship model less robust, law schools might have developed a 
more seamless curriculum or even one that prioritized context-based learning, augmented 
by courses in doctrine.83 
As it was, however, law schools sought to add value beyond that offered by the 
apprenticeship and to establish their academic credibility within the broader university. 
Their contribution was instruction in foundational legal principles delivered through 
Harvard Law School Dean Christopher Columbus Langdell’s pioneering “case 
method.”84 Harvard President Charles William Eliot, who appointed Langdell, famously 
described law as a science, one that was better learned in the library than in the 
courtroom.85 This perspective, combined with the spread of the case method, ultimately 
gave rise to the idea of two types of legal competencies inculcated through distinct 
pedagogies—academic knowledge learned in law school and practical skills obtained in 
the field.86 
The second practice—combining the expectation of scholarship solely with 
doctrinal teaching—followed logically from the first. The sine qua non of an academic 
discipline, the pursuit of scholarship corroborated the Langdellian view that the study of 
law was an intellectual, scientific endeavor and, of course, aligned the law school with 
the research goals of the broader university.87 At the time of Harvard’s ascendance, 
apprenticeships providing practical training were still commonplace, so the “research 
professor” model was necessarily exclusive to doctrinal faculty.88 Unsurprisingly then, 
when practice-oriented law school courses emerged in the middle of the last        
century—legal research and writing in the 1940s and 1950s; clinics in the 1960s and 
1970s—they were staffed by practitioners rather than research professors.89 This 
reinforced the idea that skills teaching was unsophisticated and best suited to someone 
without scholarly proclivities or capacity.90 The image of a skills professor as a 
nonscholar practitioner cemented. 
 
 83. For instance, modern law schools might have resembled the Litchfield Law School, which evolved 
in the late eighteenth century outside the university systems. It provided courses in foundational doctrinal law, 
taught by practitioners, as a supplement to the apprentices’ office experience. See Spencer, supra note 1, at 
1966–68. 
 84. On the history of the case method and the role of Dean Langdell, see generally STEVENS, supra note 
1, at 52–56; Spencer, supra note 1, at 1973–74. 
 85. 2 CHARLES WARREN, HISTORY OF THE HARVARD LAW SCHOOL AND OF EARLY LEGAL CONDITIONS 
IN AMERICA 391–92 (1908). 
 86. See Spencer, supra note 1, at 1972. That is not to suggest that Langdell was hostile to the practice of 
law. His goal seemingly was to enhance knowledge and thereby elevate the profession. See Jeffrey D. Jackson 
& David R. Cleveland, American Legal Education: A History of Integrated Instruction, in THE 
DOCTRINE-SKILLS DIVIDE: LEGAL EDUCATION’S SELF-INFLICTED WOUND, supra note 6, at 277, 285–86. 
 87. See CHARLES W. ELIOT, LANGDELL AND THE LAW SCHOOL (1895), reprinted in 1 THE HISTORY OF 
THE LEGAL EDUCATION IN THE UNITED STATES 509, 510 (Steve Sheppard ed., 1999). 
 88. See Spencer, supra note 1, at 1975–77 (“With this vision, the career, legal professoriate was born, 
purely academic in character and divorced from the practicing bar.”). 
 89. See Linda H. Edwards, The Trouble with Categories: What Theory Can Teach Us About the 
Doctrine-Skills Divide, 64 J. LEGAL EDUC. 181, 198 (2014) [hereinafter Edwards, Categories]; Spencer, supra 
note 1, at 2012–13; Melissa H. Weresh, Form and Substance: Standards for Promotion and Retention of Legal 
Writing Faculty on Clinical Tenure Track, 37 GOLDEN GATE U. L. REV. 281, 285 (2007). 
 90. Edwards, Categories, supra note 89, at 198–99. 
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The last practice—academically focused hiring criteria—is the legacy of the other 
two. One of Langdell’s first hires was James Barr Ames, a recent Harvard Law School 
graduate, just two years out of school, who had never practiced law.91 His background 
and interests neatly aligned with the Langdellian idea of an academic law professor, and 
his vast achievements ultimately vindicated Langdell’s vision.92 As a consequence, 
Ames became an ideal—a prototype—for candidates that law schools deem suitable to 
join the professorate.93 
The employment discrimination literature that focused on the adverse effects of 
work/family conflict on women’s careers sheds light on this phenomenon. Scholars in 
this field use the term “ideal worker” to describe a set of employee expectations that 
derive from a male norm and disadvantage women who disproportionately bear the 
responsibilities of family life.94 Ideal worker expectations ossify and become 
synonymous with the job itself. This prevents the employer from imagining other ways 
of defining the job or the qualifications necessary to hold it, even when doing so would 
meet the employer’s goals equally or better.95 Thus, many employers maintain “full-time 
face-time” requirements for their most valued jobs and tend to resist long-term, part-time, 
and other flexible work arrangements that would better accommodate “non-ideal” female 
employees.96 
With respect to faculty, law school hiring committees maintain an ideal worker 
image derived from James Barr Ames in seeking tenure-line candidates. Competition is 
such that law schools now seek not only scholarly potential but a record of existing 
scholarship, even for entry-level candidates.97 Otherwise, however, the profile of the 
typical tenure-line hire is likely to look very much like Ames—a recent graduate from 
 
 91. Spencer, supra note 1, at 1975–76. His prior professional experience was limited to teaching 
languages and medieval history at Harvard College. Id. 
 92. See id. at 1976. 
 93. Id. 
 94. See JOAN WILLIAMS, UNBENDING GENDER: WHY FAMILY AND WORK CONFLICT AND WHAT TO DO 
ABOUT IT 64–84, 113 (2000) (describing how market work is structured around an ideal worker who has no 
household or caregiving responsibilities and who receives a free flow of domestic work). The phrase is widely 
used throughout gender discrimination literature. See, e.g., Rachel Arnow-Richman, Public Law and Private 
Process: Toward an Incentivized Organizational Justice Model of Equal Employment Quality for Caregivers, 
2007 UTAH L. REV. 25, 37; Michele E. Gilman, En-Gendering Economic Inequality, 32 COLUM. J. GENDER & 
L. 1, 14 (2016); Kessler, Domino Effect, supra note 73, at 1077–78; Laura T. Kessler, The Attachment 
Gap: Employment Discrimination Law, Women’s Cultural Caregiving, and the Limits of Economic and Liberal 
Legal Theory, 34 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 371, 375 (2001); Michelle A. Travis, Recapturing the Transformative 
Potential of Employment Discrimination Law, 62 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 3, 10 (2005); Joan C. Williams, 
Deconstructing Gender, 87 MICH. L. REV. 797, 822–23 (1989) [hereinafter Williams, Deconstructing]; Joan C. 
Williams, Restructuring Work and Family Entitlements Around Family Values, 19 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 
753, 753–55 (1996); Joan C. Williams & Nancy Segal, Beyond the Maternal Wall: Relief for Family Caregivers 
Who Are Discriminated Against on the Job, 26 HARV. WOMEN’S L.J. 77, 80 (2003). 
 95. See Kathryn Abrams, Gender Discrimination and the Transformation of Workplace Norms, 42 VAND. 
L. REV. 1183, 1227 (1989); Travis, supra note 94, at 12; Williams, Deconstructing, supra note 94, at 822–23. 
 96. Travis, supra note 94, at 5–6 (describing a “full-time face-time norm” that requires “full-time 
positions, unlimited hours, rigid work schedules, an uninterrupted worklife, and performance of work at a central 
location”). 
 97. See Adamson et al., Clinical Faculty, supra note 53, at 137; Spencer, supra note 1, at 2049–51. 
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an elite school with little to no legal practice experience.98 That model persists despite 
many law schools’ explicit commitments to producing practice-ready graduates and 
critics’ calls for greater prioritization and integration of skills training.99 
Law schools espousing a practice-readiness mission ought to sensibly modify their 
hiring practices to meet these challenges and deliver on their commitments.100 Yet they 
continue to devalue legal experience when filling tenure-line positions while also 
pursuing candidates with strong practice backgrounds for lower-status positions that are 
presumed to be incompatible with scholarship.101 Hence, the most pernicious aspect of 
the bifurcated faculty is that, like the ideal worker norm and the problem of subconscious 
biases more generally, it reproduces itself.102 Those who have the desire and ability to 
teach skills are ineligible for tenure and consequently are not incentivized to produce 
scholarship.103 This perpetuates the idea that they lack that capacity and seemingly 
justifies bifurcation. Meanwhile tenure-line faculty, supported and rewarded for 
scholarly productivity, have no incentive to modernize their teaching methods or 
augment the skills content of their courses; they are free to prioritize writing and maintain 
their privileged status.104 
 
 98. Studies of the law school hiring market bear this out. See, e.g., Tracey E. George & Albert H. Yoon, 
The Labor Market for New Law Professors, 11 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 1, 37 (2014) (finding that 
“[g]raduating from a Tier 1 law school . . . dramatically improves a candidate’s chance of being offered a 
tenure-track job [as a law professor], holding other qualifications constant”); Susan P. Liemer & Hollee S. 
Temple, Did Your Legal Writing Professor Go to Harvard?: The Credentials of Legal Writing Faculty at Hiring 
Time, 46 U. LOUISVILLE L. REV. 383, 407 (20-08) (reviewing numerous studies of credentials of entering 
tenure-line faculty and concluding that “despite striking demographic changes in the law professorate [over the 
decades], the single most consistently expected credential of tenure-line hires has been a degree from one of the 
top law schools”). Recent research prepared for this symposium reveals that the bias for elite credentials extends 
beyond evaluation of new law professors’ law school degrees to their undergraduate institutions as well. See 
Milan Markovic, The Law Professor Pipeline, 92 TEMP. L. REV. 813, 822 (2020) (finding that forty percent of 
new law professors attended Ivy-Plus colleges and another thirty-three percent attended a non-Ivy elite private 
college). 
 99. See George & Yoon, supra note 98, at 37–38 (suggesting the “strong path dependence in law school 
hiring provides stability but possibly at the price of innovation and adaptation”). 
 100. See id. (questioning the “capacity of new hires to teach skills courses and to assist students making 
the transition to . . . real-world jobs” given their “lack of real-world experience”). 
 101. In a recent study of legal writing hires prepared for this symposium, Professor Cody Jacobs found 
that forty percent of legal writing programs reported that their most recent hire had in excess of ten years of 
practice experience. See Cody J. Jacobs, The “Other” Market, 92 TEMP. L. REV. 765, 774 (2020). Moreover, in 
sharp contrast to the hiring priorities for tenure-line doctrinal faculty, a full ninety percent of respondents said 
that practice experience was important or very important in their evaluation of candidates. See id. 
 102. See Kennedy, supra note 5, at 234 (describing the “self-perpetuating” system of the doctrine/skills 
“categories” whereby “working in one . . . disables you from working in the other”); Mary Beth Beazley, 
“Riddikulus!”: Tenure-Track Legal-Writing Faculty and the Boggart in the Wardrobe, 7 SCRIBES J. LEGAL 
WRITING 79, 84–85 (2000) (observing how the low status of legal writing positions disincentivizes the highest 
qualified candidates from pursuing a legal writing career, ostensibly justifying the lower status). 
 103. See Stanchi, supra note 8, at 483–84 (questioning why legal writing faculty would take on the work 
of scholarship when they are “categorically denied the primary incentive to publish: they are ineligible for tenure, 
no matter how much they write, and no matter what the quality”). 
 104.  Beazley, supra note 8, at 299 (noting how “faculty who teach theoretical subjects . . . have ample 
time for scholarship if they implement the traditional teaching methods” that involve lecture and discussion with 
a single final examination); Stanchi, supra note 8, at 484–85 (describing how doctrinal faculty, who perform 
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III. TOWARD AN INTEGRATED FACULTY 
The solution to these problems is well within reach. Because the bifurcated faculty 
is in some respects a managerial choice, law schools can change their staffing practices 
and role expectations, just as new economy companies have done to enhance flexibility 
and nimbleness.105 They can similarly redress the stereotypes embedded in the bifurcated 
faculty. Problems of discrimination and inclusion can seem intractable in the broader 
labor economy where disadvantages tied to race, gender, and other protected 
characteristics are not merely a matter of workplace structures but a part of social history. 
In the case of the bifurcated faculty, however, the problem is one of the academy’s own 
making. Law schools created the workplace structures and inculcated the expectations 
that led to and continue to perpetuate differential treatment of skills faculty.106 They are 
therefore able to—and should aspire to—dismantle the resulting hierarchy.107 
Several law schools have already attempted to abolish the skills/doctrine divide and 
offer models for how best to achieve an integrated faculty as well as pitfalls to avoid.108 
One well-intentioned but ultimately flawed approach is to create so-called programmatic 
tenure that grants tenure to skills faculty within their specific areas.109 While this 
approach equalizes working conditions of doctrinal and skills faculty in some respects, 
it does so only at the margins. Tenure-line skills faculty obtain equal job security, but 
they do not achieve equal voice or parity in pay or prestige.110 Programmatic tenure 
standards often place less importance on scholarly productivity, reinforcing assumptions 
about the intellectual capabilities of skills faculty and the sophistication of skills 
teaching.111 Worst of all, such systems reaffirm the subject matter divide between skills 
 
less onerous teaching than legal writing faculty, enjoy “additional free time, as well as intellectual and 
psychological free space, which they can then devote to the more highly valued pursuit of scholarship”). 
 105. See supra Part II.A. 
 106. See supra Part II.B. 
 107. A core concern of antidiscrimination scholarship is how and to what extent to hold employers 
accountable for enduring disparities tied to subconscious bias against women and minority workers. See 
generally Kessler, Domino Effect, supra note 73, at 1046 (describing the tension between “‘demand side’ and 
‘supply side’ explanations of worker inequality” in theoretical accounts of employment discrimination liability). 
Pro-plaintiff scholars have made a compelling case that employers should be held liable where they disregard or 
fail to mitigate subconscious bias that is enabled by their own organizational choices. See generally GREEN, 
LAUNDERING, supra note 73; Stephanie Bornstein, Reckless Discrimination, 105 CALIF. L. REV. 1055 (2017). 
The argument is much stronger with the bifurcated faculty where the categories underlying subconscious bias 
are institutionally created. See supra Part II.B. 
 108. See, e.g., Christopher, supra note 8 (detailing transition from non-tenure-line legal writing program 
to tenure-line system at Texas Tech Law School). See generally Deborah A. Maranville et al., Faculty Status 
and Institutional Effectiveness, in BUILDING ON BEST PRACTICES: TRANSFORMING LEGAL EDUCATION IN A 
CHANGING WORLD 432, 438–43 (Deborah Maranville et al. eds., 2015) (describing four possible pathways to 
equalizing the status of skills faculty). 
 109. See 2017–2018 ALWD/LWI SURVEY, supra note 6, at viii (defining programmatic tenure as 
“[t]enure that is achieved through a separate track/using different standards than traditional tenure awarded to 
doctrinal faculty”). 
 110. Bryan L. Adamson et al., The Status of Clinical Faculty in the Legal Academy: Report of the Task 
Force on the Status of Clinicians and the Legal Academy, 36 J. LEGAL PROF. 353, 392–93 (2012) [hereinafter 
Adamson et al., Task Force Report]; Maranville et al., supra note 108, at 441. 
 111. See Adamson et al., Task Force Report, supra note 110, at 393 (“[E]ach status model other than 
[traditional] tenure . . . institutionally preserves a lower status for clinical faculty.”); Maranville et al., supra note 
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and doctrine, precluding true curricular integration. Programmatic tenure is simply 
another silo. 
True integration requires a single tenure track, one in which all faculty are subject 
to the same standards. Delineating the content and structure of such a system is an 
undertaking that goes beyond the scope of this Essay. The basic model, however, is 
simple: a system that evaluates all full-time faculty hires and candidates for promotion 
on the same three criteria for tenure—the potential for and achievement of excellence in 
scholarship, teaching, and service—regardless of their course package.112 Those 
standards must be applied expansively and inclusively while upholding the institution’s 
commitment to excellence. For instance, law schools currently prioritize the publication 
of full-length law review articles placed in elite journals when evaluating faculty 
scholarship.113 The publication of such articles, however valuable, should not be the sole 
criterion by which law schools assess faculty contributions to academic discourse. 
Rather, scholarship should be evaluated for its quality, irrespective of its subject, format, 
or methodology.114 All faculty should be encouraged to produce and rewarded for the 
production of pedagogical scholarship and shorter-length articles that meet standards of 
excellence.115 
Similarly, schools must find meaningful and comprehensive ways to evaluate 
faculty teaching. Institutional assessment of teaching often lacks rigor, placing undue 
weight on student evaluations.116 Schools must find ways to better peer assess teaching 
quality and student outcomes. Moreover, the evaluation of teaching should consider the 
degree to which faculty inculcate professional competencies other than just doctrinal 
learning.117 Neither the burden of making students practice ready nor the expectation to 
innovate pedagogically should fall solely on the shoulders of skills faculty.118 The 
 
108, at 441 (recognizing that at institutions that prize scholarship non-scholars will be seen as “lesser” regardless 
of the conferral of tenure). 
 112. Many scholars who have critiqued the bifurcated faculty have espoused such a solution. See, e.g., 
Adamson et al., Task Force Report, supra note 110, at 389; Beazley, supra note 8, at 314–15; Merritt, supra 
note 54, at 416. 
 113. See, e.g., W. Lawrence Church, A Plea for Readable Law Review Articles, 1989 WIS. L. REV. 739, 
743. 
 114. See Maranville et al., supra note 108, at 439–40. This is of critical importance with respect to legal 
writing scholarship, which has long been discredited. See Beazley, supra note 8, at 296–98 (discussing roots of 
this historical bias). 
 115. There are other potential benefits to this. For instance, shorter works in mainstream publications are 
more accessible to jurists and practitioners, increasing the potential for faculty scholarship to impact law and 
policy. See Church, supra note 113, at 743. 
 116. Among other failures, it is widely agreed that student evaluations reflect race and gender bias. See, 
e.g., Debra S. Austin, Leadership Lapse: Laundering Systemic Bias Through Student Evaluations, VILL. L. REV. 
(forthcoming 2020), http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3550086 [https://perma.cc/
U75J-G8WL]; Meera E. Deo, A Better Tenure Battle: Fighting Bias in Teaching Evaluations, 31 COLUM. J. 
GENDER & L. 7, 10 (2015). 
 117. Erickson, supra note 51, at 88 (“Experiential learning is not just appropriate for the relatively few 
skills courses in law schools. It is the best way to teach all material in law schools . . . . Students learn by 
experiencing, and doctrine is no exception.” (footnote omitted)). 
 118. See Beazley, supra note 8, at 276 (warning that meaningful reform must “shift the behavior of the 
Brahmins” lest responsibility for enhanced education fall solely “onto the laps of the skills faculty who don’t 
have the job security to say no or the power to spread the reforms beyond their own classrooms”); Stanchi, supra 
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effective delivery of professional knowledge and the production of impactful scholarship 
are everyone’s responsibility. 
To be sure, these goals will not be achieved easily or painlessly. The unraveling of 
ingrained expectations and institutional practices that go back decades requires not only 
patience and tenacity but also the ability to engage in critical self-reflection.119 Like any 
meaningful scholarly inquiry, however, it is a process worth undertaking. 
CONCLUSION 
This Essay called on law schools to reject the bifurcated faculty, a system that is 
grounded in assumptions that devalue skills faculty and that is out of step with 
contemporary reform efforts. Legal education critics have made a convincing case that 
cognitive knowledge and professional skills are of equal importance, if they are even 
distinguishable. Best practices demand they be taught as part of an integrated learning 
experience. Law schools could better position themselves to achieve this type of 
curriculum and meet their educational goals by rejecting the bifurcated faculty in favor 
of true integration. In the end, silos stymie educational reform and shortchange students. 
Schools that eradicate the bifurcated faculty can achieve a better educational product 
while realizing a more egalitarian workplace. 
 
note 8, at 484 (describing how in the bifurcated faculty “the fruits of the labor of legal writing professors are 
ultimately enjoyed by the higher ranked doctrinal professors . . . who are ‘exonerated’ from more intensive 
teaching and student advising roles because others are doing this devalued work”). 
 119. See Christopher, supra note 8, at 80 (offering a list of provocative “questions to consider” for 
tenure-line faculty “resistant to the idea” of tenure for legal writing faculty). 
